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SAFETY PROGRAMS, SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
AND IMPLICATIONS FOR HUMAN PERFORMANCE 1
Julia Pounds, Ph.D.2
TempoLogics
Mustang, OK
Paul Krois, Ph.D., PMP.3
Crown Consulting Inc.
Aurora, CO
A State Safety Program (SSP) and a Safety Management System (SMS) are both
part of the Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) promoted by the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to support international safety
in air navigation, flight inspections, air accident investigations, training,
certification, and related areas. This paper discusses roles and responsibilities of
the regulator and service provider focusing on human performance in oversight
versus operations. Clarification is intended to help both regulators and operators
focus on executing their separate and distinct roles and responsibilities for
oversight versus operations. Left unaddressed, role confusion between the
organizations can result in safety programs with potentially hazardous gaps,
ineffective mitigations or inefficient overlaps. The US SSP is used to illustrate
with examples of how these programs can impact human performance.
A major pillar of aviation safety is international cooperation between the national
governments that were signatory States to the 1944 Convention on International Civil Aviation
(the “Chicago Convention”). As civilian and military air transport grew and the need for
standardization increased, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) - an
international framework for cooperation - developed and eventually in 1947 became a United
Nations’ specialized agency. ICAO works with member States to promote international
Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs). These SARPS include the ICAO State Safety
Program (SSP) and with it the Safety Management System (SMS) construct. SMS is a formal
framework of processes and practices performed to identify and assess potential hazards. The
State is responsible for its SSP but delegates many of its responsibilities to a State regulatory
office. The State’s delegated regulatory office performs the actual oversight and surveillance of
the SARPs and ANSP, e.g., related to air navigation, flight inspections, air accident
investigations, training, certification, and related areas.
Our discussion focusses on human performance topics for two groups: regulatory
personnel who perform oversight and ANSP personnel perform operations to execute air
navigation services. As explained above, these two groups within the SSP act in concert to
accomplish safety goals. For the purposes of this paper, we’ve used examples from the US SSP.
FAA Order 8000.369 (2020) helps FAA organizations integrate SMS and/or ICAO SSP
guidance into their organizations.
----------------------------1
The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not reflect policies or
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2
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Per its international agreements with ICAO, the US government funds its SSP and
delegates its aviation SSP responsibilities to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). In turn,
the FAA Administrator delegates responsibilities for regulation of aviation to Aviation Safety
(AVS) an organization within the FAA. Within AVS, the Air Traffic Safety Oversight Service
(AOV), is responsible for oversight of the FAA ANSP – the Air Traffic Organization (ATO).
“Situated within the Aviation Safety (AVS) organization, the Air Traffic Safety Oversight
Service [AOV] establishes safety standards and provides independent oversight of the Air
Traffic Organization – the provider of air traffic services in the United States.”
(https://www.faa.gov/)
“The Air Traffic Organization (ATO) is the operational arm of the FAA. It is responsible
for providing safe and efficient air navigation services to 29.4 million square miles of
airspace.” (https://www.faa.gov/)
To illustrate the distinction between oversight versus operational responsibilities, the
following example is provided: In 2007, AOV conducted an audit of ATO turn to final (TTF)
procedures that focused on the methods of separation used while vectoring aircraft to join the
final approach. The audit team analyzed data from reports of separation violations (operational
errors) from the prior two years. The audit found that the 12 facilities audited were in compliance
with then current ATO requirements. The audit also identified that those facilities in the data
sample using standardized altitude requirements for all approach configurations had a lower
percentage of TTF operational errors than those facilities without standardized requirements.
AOV requested that ATO review the report and respond with its determination of the potential
impact and national applicability of standardized requirements, and the potential reduction of
certain types of operational errors.
The idea that additional clarification of these relationships would be helpful emerged
from discussions among AOV personnel about roles, responsibilities, activities and methods for
AOV oversight. These discussions were often fraught and complicated, in part, because
imprecise foundational guidance allowed for multiple interpretations. For example, see the
description posted with FAA Order 8000.369C:
”This order establishes the Safety Management System (SMS) policy and requirements
for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The requirements contained within this
document are intended to help FAA organizations incorporate SMS and/or International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) State Safety Program (SSP) requirements into their
organizations. FAA organization SMSs work together to form the overall FAA SMS.”
Retrieved from https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/orders_notices/i
Perhaps, a clearer statement would be: “FAA organization SMSs work together to form
the overall FAA execution of the US SSP framework. The FAA SMS establishes policy for the
different FAA organizations in establishing their own individual SMSs for execution.” For
another example of this ambiguity, see Figure 1 retrieved from https://m3rsms.com.au/icao/.
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"States shall establish a State Safety Program (SSPJ. in
order to achieve an acceptable level of safety (ALoS} in
civil aviation·
nnex 19

he SSP a d SMS fra ewor' recom e'loed by ICAO
are the same.

Figure 1. Example of SSP and SMS ambiguity.
Historically, some things had not been clarified so that both organizations shared
understandings and expectations about the meaning of “establish safety standards” and the scope
of AOV oversight. While SMS includes formal risk management processes, such as assessing
effectiveness of mitigations such as evaluating training success, a lack of clarity might lead to a
failure of the regulator or the ANSP to identify an existing risk, e.g., a gap in controller training
for a new procedure or that operational personnel had insufficient information about changes in
operational procedures.
The relationships between the SSP and SMS programs are illustrated using the line of
sight example shown in Figure 2 below. Both oversight of air traffic services and ANSP delivery
of those services require that personnel in both organizations have deep knowledge about the
operations that support those services. Thus, discussion such as methods for execution of a CE
needs to also specify to which organization it pertains; otherwise, misunderstandings are
possible. Figure 2 was initially generated to help with explaining these similarities and
differences. For example, CE 4 and CE 6 could be interpreted as pertaining to either/both
organizations.
SSP CE 4: Ensure personnel are qualified/competent in their functional areas of responsibility.


ATO ensures that its personnel are hired, trained, and certified to safely perform all activities
to support and execute air navigation, including using existing and new equipment systems
and accomplishing safe operations according to requirements.



AOV ensures that its personnel are trained in the role of the regulator and oversight methods,
such as how to conduct audits and assessments to determine compliance and how to evaluate
ATO safety documents. Since its beginning AOV has conducted audits and assessments to
examine many ATO performance requirements, such as, turns to final, fatigue risk
management, credentialing of personnel, qualification of personnel on new equipment, and
procedures for opposite direction operations.

SSP CE 6: Ensure policies for licensing, certification, authorization and/or approval obligations.


ATO ensures that its personnel are current in their training and that requirements are met for
each to maintain operational and medical certifications.



AOV established a program to credential its personnel as Air Traffic Safety Inspectors
(ATSI) by meeting training requirements. Those maintaining an ATSI credential are
qualified to conduct oversight activities.
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Example
Line of Sight Diagram from ICAO to AOV Oversight

L_

World Agreements (Chicago Convention, ICAO), SARPs
State Safety Manag~!}1ent (SS1_1)
State Safety Oversight System (SSO)
- fonndation of the SSP

I

State Safe

AOV -Performs Oversight

Program @Sr)
AOV Hierarchy/Line of Sight

4 COMPONENTS (with 8 Critical Elements)

SSO: Provides foundation for SSP Critical Elements

3.1 The State Safety Program (SSP) shall include the
fo llowing components:

SSP: AOV executes 7 CEs based on CE I:
SSP Component I Policy, Objectives, & Resources

1. State Safety Policy, Objectives, and Resources

(CE 1): US Gov't publishes requirements

2. State Safety Risk Management

(CE 2): AOV publishes Order, SOCs,

3. State Safety Assurance

(CE 3): AOV organized for oversight functi ons

4. State Safety Promotion

Al°'l'SP Policy/Framework for its
Safety Management System
(SMS)
Safety policy and objectives
Safety risk management

(CE 4) : AOV staff are qualified for oversight
(CE 5) : AOV provides tools & resources for
oversight
SSP Component 2 AOV Safety Risk Management

Oversight of Compliance
&SMS

(CE 6): AOVensures perfo1mers meet
requirements

& Other e.g., ANSP SMS Policy/Framework
. - - - - - - --. -- - SSP Component 3 AOV Safety Assurance

Safety assurance

(CE 7): AOV Smveillance Obligations

Safety promotion

(CE 8): AOV Resolution of Safety Issues
-Component4 AOV Safety Promotion

Figure 2. Relationships between US SSP oversight by AOV and the ANSP (ATO).
Because ANSP operations depends on human performance in context, by capturing,
measuring and understanding these activities as they are performed in the operational context,
they can be better understood in the safety context. Thus the regulator’s obligation to focus on
actual performance rather than on oversight of the ANSP’s SMS formalisms may arguably be
relatively more important to safety oversight. Approval of the ANSP SMS may be necessary but
not sufficient for oversight and safety assurance. Cambon, Guarnieri, and Groeneweg (2006)
recommended that, while a formal SMS corresponds to a formal organizational description, an
equally or more important focus would be the influence of the SMS on the operational working
environment and practices of people. Reason (2001) speculated how an ANSP would build and
operate an effective SMS and how regulators would recognize and evaluate it.
ICAO manual (Doc 10151) discusses how the State can integrate human performance
(HP) in its SSP by embedding HP in key oversight responsibilities and activities, such as when
evaluating the ANSP’s SMS and when conducting surveillance to determine if the ANSP meets
these regulatory requirements (ICAO, 2021). CANSO (2019) provided the aviation community
with a Standard of Excellence in Human Performance Management that offers information to
help ANSPs improve their human performance management.
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These oversight activities can take several forms and feedback from the regulator to the
ANSP can provide useful human performance information for improving safety that the ANSP
may not otherwise have. For example:

AOV conducted an audit in FY07 to evaluate compliance by ATO personnel with
procedures for turns to final arrival configurations for vectoring aircraft to join the final approach
course and whether the procedures had an impact on the number of separation violations
(operational errors). The audit included the separation procedures used by controllers. The audit
found that all facilities sampled were in compliance but that facilities using standardized altitude
requirements had a lower percentage of operational errors than those facilities not using
standardized requirements. The audit also found that complete records for controllers’ turns-tofinal refresher training could not be documented. Some facilities did not include turns-to-final
procedures in their recurrent training curriculum. AOV requested that ATO determine whether a
national standardized requirement would be applicable for potential reduction of operational
errors and to update their training records and curriculum maintenance processes.

AOV conducted an audit in FY17 of the ATO Fatigue Risk Management. Program Office.
The audit team noted (1) a lack of delegation of responsibilities for feedback to the program
office from facilities after fatigue mitigations were executed. This lack of feedback prevents the
program from understanding what efforts are effective for reducing ATC fatigue related errors.
(2) a lack of clarity about how the program evaluates or validates the success of its
communications and mitigations. This lack of information impedes continuous improvements and
(3) out of date documentation.

AOV conducted an audit in FY15 of ATO compliance with its responsibilities for the
Credentialing and Control Tower Operator Certification Program. The audit found that the ATO
used inconsistent or deficient management controls to ensure compliance with its credentialing
requirements. The ATO conducted activities to come back into compliance with their
requirements.

AOV conducted an audit in FY18 of the management controls for credentialing ATO
safety personnel. The program ensures that no person provides direct safety-related air traffic
control services or certifications unless the person has the appropriate credentials, ratings, and/or
skills evaluations for the safety services provided. Inconsistent management of credentials and
ratings introduces the potential for risk into the NAS. The auditors found that the ATO had gaps
in execution of management process controls. Inadequate or incomplete verification of
compliance with their Credentialing Program requirements creates the potential for personnel
providing safety-related services to not be properly credentialed. AOV notified the ATO of
planned future surveillance activities to ensure that these gaps were corrected.

AOV conducted an audit in FY08 to determine ATO compliance with the requirement to
provide to controllers with refresher training that maintains and upgrades the knowledge and
skills necessary to apply air traffic procedures in a safe and efficient manner. This audit included
the delivery of training and evaluation of its effectiveness. AOV found a lack of program
guidance for the refresher training program. The lack of program guidance for refresher training
leads to inconsistencies in facility-level training when some level of consistency across the NAS
might be desirable. The required auditable process for managing refresher training was not
observed and training was not being developed or delivered in conformance with directives for
administering training. The refresher training records examined did not provide a reliable record
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for historical accuracy or for making training improvements and no evidence was found that any
systematic evaluation of refresher training effectiveness was being done. For example, the focus
for evaluation was materials rather than the effects of the training on employees’ performance
and the responsibilities, partly because ensuring training effectiveness was assigned across
different organizations. AOV continued periodic oversight of the program to monitor its
improvements.

AOV conducted an audit in FY15 of the Enhanced Back-up System (EBUS) in the En
Route Automation Modernization (ERAM) Program. The audit found the ATO had contradictory
training and operational requirements. The contradictory requirements resulted in a variety of
responses at the service delivery points as to using EBUS as a mitigation control for a high risk
hazard in the national airspace. The ATO addressed these conflicts and was advised that AOV
would continue to monitor the ATO management of the ERAM Program.
Discussion
While ICAO promotes aviation safety through SSP standards and recommendations,
execution of the SSP is the responsibility of each State and is implemented through the State’s
regulator. The success of the State’s program ultimately relies good communication between the
regulator and the ANSP because the goal of both SSP and SMS is to identify and manage safety
risks.
Focusing on safety risks introduced by human performance in the system, one could
expect each organization to approach it by different means - the regulator through particular
oversight and surveillance of influences on human performance with feedback to the ANSP and
the ANSP through execution of safety management controls to ensure operational performance
of its personnel and successful implementation of safety mitigations. Role clarity supports
communication and mitigates confusion so that the regulator and ANSP can collaborate to
improve safety in all these areas.
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